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iv

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff and Appellee,

:

Case No.960689-CA

:

Priority No. 2

v.
TRACY EUGENE SMITH,
Defendant and Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4) (1996)
(transfer from the Utah Supreme Court).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in this capital murder case when it
recommended to the Board of Pardons and Parole that defendant should serve 20
years before being eligible for parole? This Court reviews the sentencing decisions of
a trial court for abuse of discretion. State v. Houk. 906 P.2d 907 (Utah App. 1995)
(citing State v. Nuttall. 861 P.2d 454, 456 (Utah App. 1993)). Abuse of discretion
"may be manifest if the actions of the judge in sentencing were 'inherently unfair' or if
the judge imposed a 'clearly excessive sentence.'" State v. Wright. 893 P.2d 1113,
1120 (Utah App. 1995) (citations omitted). An appellate court may only find abuse "if

it can be said that no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial
court." LL
Because the sentencing question at issue is the trial court's advisory opinion to
the Board of Pardons, the "pasture" under State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994), is
necessarily large and the trial court's discretion very broad.
2. Did the statute requiring a trial court's opinion about a defendant's
eligibility for parole violate the constitutional provision regarding separation of
powers? Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law, and this Court
reviews a trial court's conclusions about constitutionality for correctness. State v.
Robertson. 886 P.2d 85 (Utah 1994). When reviewing a statute for constitutionality,
the statute is presumed constitutional, and this Court "resolve[s] any reasonable doubts
in favor of constitutionality." Ryan v. Gold Cross Services. 903 P.2d 423 (Utah 1995)
(citing Society of Separationists. Inc. v. Whitehead. 870 P.2d 916, 920 (Utah 1993)).
Defendant failed to raise this issue before the trial court. "As a general rule,
appellate courts will not consider an issue, including a constitutional argument, raised
for the first time on appeal unless the trial court committed plain error or the case
involves exceptional circumstances." State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah App.
1993).
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Constitution, Article V, Section 1:
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided
into three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the
Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly
belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any function
appertaining to either of the others, except in cases herein expressly
directed or permitted.
Utah Code Ann. §77-27-13(5)(a) (1996):
In all sentences where an indeterminate sentence is imposed, the
judge imposing the sentence shall within 30 days from the date of the
sentence, mail to the chief executive of the [B]oard [of Pardons and
Parole] a statement in writing setting out the term for which, in his
opinion, the offender sentenced should be imprisoned, and any
information he may have regarding the character of the offender or any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances connected with the offense for
which the offender has been convicted. . . .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant pled guilty to first degree murder, a capital offense, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202(1 )(d) (1988),1 in exchange for a sentence to life
imprisonment and agreement by the State not to recommend the death penalty or offer
aggravating circumstances (R. 22-29). Defendant's plea was accepted, and he was
sentenced on November 22, 1988, to life in prison (R. 30-32). The trial court
recommended that defendant serve 20 years before being eligible for parole (R. 31).

1

The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted "aggravated
murder" for "murder in the first degree."
3

On December 4, 1991, defendant, pro se, moved to withdraw his guilty plea (R.
100-113).2 On February 24, 1992, the trial court denied the motion (R. 150-54), and
defendant appealed (R. 182). Defendant withdrew the trial court's denial of his motion
as the basis for his appeal before the Court's decision, and argued instead that the trial
court was in error for recommending that defendant serve a minimum of 20 years
before being eligible for parole. In a unanimous decision, the Utah Supreme Court
refused to address the issue since it was raised for the first time on appeal and since
there were no extraordinary circumstances. State v. Smith. 866 P.2d 532 (Utah 1993).
On December 4, 1992, defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
alleging that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel during sentencing. Id,.
He asserted, among other things, that it was deficient performance for trial defense
counsel to fail to object to the 20-year recommendation of the trial court. On
November 22, 1993, the district court denied defendant's petition, adjudicating facts
that are also at issue here. A certified copy of the district court's findings, conclusions,
and order is attached (appendix A).
On May 15, 1996, defendant filed a pro se motion alleging that his sentence was
illegal, and requesting an order to modify it (R. 187-202). On July 19, 1996, the trial

2

The 30-day rule (s££ Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6 (1994); State v. Price. 837
P.2d 578 (Utah App. 1992)) was not yet in effect and may not be applied retroactively.
State v. Abeyta. 852 P.2d 993 (Utah 1993).
4

court denied defendant's motion and filed a Memorandum Opinion explaining its ruling
(appendix B). Defendant, pro se, now appeals denial of this motion.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 3, 1988, defendant murdered James Glen Bray in a restroom at a
rest stop in a failed robbery attempt (R. 55-60; S££ also appendix A, paragraph 24 at
4). Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court sentenced defendant on November 22,
1988, to "a term of incarceration for [defendant's] natural life in the Utah State Prison"
(R. 31). In addition, the court recommended "that the Defendant not be allowed parole
or even be considered for parole until he has served at least Twenty (20) years." I^L
After a hearing, the district court considering defendant's December 4, 1992
habeas petition, adjudicated the following facts relevant to defendant's current appeal:
17. [Trial defense counsel] correctly advised petitioner that the
length of time he would actually serve in prison was under the exclusive
control of the Board of Pardons, which would be greatly influenced by
petitioner's conduct while in prison.
18. The trial judge's 20-year recommendation is not a major factor
relied on by the Board of Pardons in setting parole rehearing dates. Such
recommendations are accorded greater or lesser weight depending upon
their factual support. The judge's recommendation here was based solely
on the facts of the crime itself.
19. Defendants who have pled guilty to the capital offense of first
degree murder ordinarily receive 20 to 25 year rehearing dates from the
Board of Pardons.
20. On November 12, 1991, petitioner went before the Utah
Board of Pardons for an original parole grant hearing. Petitioner was
given a rehearing date of October, 2008.
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21. The Board of Pardons stated in writing its reasons for setting a
20-year rehearing date. The reasons included petitioner's prison
misconduct, but did not include the judge's recommendation.
22. Petitioner has the right to petition the Board of Pardons for an
earlier rehearing date.
(See appendix A).
Applying the law to the relevant facts, the district court also reached the
following pertinent conclusion:
8. The Board of Pardons is not bound by the trial court's 20-year
recommendation. There is no support for petitioner's claim that, had Mr.
Shumate objected to the 20-year recommendation, petitioner would have
received a lesser sentence and/or an earlier rehearing date.

LL
Because defendant has not appealed the denial of his petition for habeas corpus,
he should be bound by the facts adjudicated in that proceeding. a[W]hen there has
been a prior adjudication of a factual issue and an application of a rule of law to those
facts . . . res judicata bars a second adjudication of the same facts under the same rule
of law." State v. Sims, 881 P.2d 840 (Utah 1994) (quoting

Salt Lake Citizens

Congress v, Mountain States Tel & Tel, 846 P.2d 1245, 1251-52 (Utah 1992).
Accordingly, the State asks this Court to take judicial notice of the adjudicated facts set
out above as res judicata and the facts of this case. Utah R. Evid. 201; Riche v. Riche.
784 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1989) (Court may take judicial notice of the records and prior
proceedings in the same case); see alSQ Gerrishv. Barnes. 844 P.2d 315, 319 (Utah
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1992) (citing Candelario v. Cook, 789 P.2d 710, 711 (Utah 1990) ("petitioner who had
failed to appeal from denial of his first petition for habeas corpus could not challenge
that denial when he appealed the denial of a subsequent petition").
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when, in this capital murder
case, it recommended that defendant serve 20 years before being eligible for
parole. Defendant pled guilty to capital murder. A sentence to "a term of
incarceration for [a defendant's] natural life" is an indeterminate sentence. There is a
statutory requirement for a judge imposing an indeterminate sentence to recommend
"the term for which, in his opinion, the offender sentenced should be imprisoned."
Utah Code Ann. §77-27-13(5)(a) (1996). Such a recommendation is not binding on the
Board of Pardons and Parole. The Board's written reasons for setting a 20-year
rehearing date in defendant's case included defendant's prison misconduct, but did not
include the judge's recommendation. The trial court's compliance with a statutory
requirement was not an abuse of discretion.
2. Because defendant failed to raise the constitutionality of the challenged
statute below, that issue is waived absent exceptional circumstances that do not
exist here. Appellate courts will not consider an issue, including a constitutional
argument, raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial court committed plain error
or the case involves exceptional circumstances. It was not plain error for the trial court
7

to comply with a statutory requirement, and defendant has failed to assert let alone
establish exceptional circumstances in this case. In any event, the challenged statute
does not violate the constitutional provision regarding separation of powers because it
does not transfer a function or give control of an Executive agency to the Judiciary.
ARGUMENT
Point I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN,
IN THIS CAPITAL MURDER CASE, IT RECOMMENDED THAT
DEFENDANT SERVE 20 YEARS BEFORE BEING ELIGIBLE FOR
PAROLE
Defendant argues that a life sentence is not indeterminate and that the trial court
should not, therefore, have made a recommendation to the Board of Pardons and Parole
related to the time he should serve (Def. Br. at 4),
A. A life sentence is indeterminate. Following defendant's guilty plea, the trial
court sentenced him "to a term of incarceration for his natural life in the Utah State
Prison" (R. 31). Under Utah's sentencing scheme, all commitments to the state prison
are considered indeterminate "unless otherwise provided by law." Utah Code Ann.
§77-18-4(a). Defendant has cited no authority for the proposition that a life sentence is
not an indeterminate sentence. Indeed, because defendant complains about the
recommendation that he should serve 20 years before being eligible for release on

8

parole, his argument presumes that a life sentence is indeterminate because it may be
modified by the Board of Pardons and Paroles.
As the trial court noted, "It is evident that the Utah Legislature considers a life
sentence for capital murder as an indeterminate sentence, since it has enacted, since the
sentencing in this case, a new possible sentence in such cases, life without possibility of
parole." (R. 208, emphasis in the original; see Utah Code Ann. §§76-3-20l(2)(f)
(1992) and 76-3-207.5(2) (1992)).
B. The trial court's opinion was not binding. In the State of Utah, the Board of
Pardons and Parole, and not the trial court, has the authority to determine when and
under what conditions sentenced prisoners "may be released upon parole, pardoned,
. . . or have their . . . sentences commuted or terminated." Utah Code Ann. §77-275(l)(a) (1996); State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236 (Utah 1995); Northern v. Barnes. 825
P.2d 696 (Utah App. 1992). "Decisions of the Board of Pardons in cases involving
paroles, pardons, commutations or terminations of sentence . . . are final and are not
subject to judicial review." Utah Code Ann. §77-27-5(3) (1995).
Given the Board's authority and discretion, the trial court's opinion was not
binding (see appendix B, paragraph 8 at 6). As noted by the district court's findings in
response to defendant's habeas petition, it is clear the Board did not consider the trial
court's opinion binding: "The Board of Pardons stated in writing its reasons for setting
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a 20-year rehearing date. The reasons included petitioner's prison misconduct, but did
not include the judge's recommendation" (appendix B, paragraph 21 at 4).
In sum, the trial court's compliance with a statutory requirement was not an
abuse of discretion.
Point II
BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILED TO RAISE THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CHALLENGED STATUTE
BELOW, THAT ISSUE IS WAIVED ABSENT EXCEPTIONAL
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT DO NOT EXIST HERE
Defendant argues for the first time on appeal that the statutory requirement for
the trial court's opinion violates the separation of powers provision of the Utah
Constitution (Def. Br. at 12; sL R. 187-202; sss. Utah Constitution, Article V, Section
1). Separation of powers means "that one department of the government cannot control
the judgment or official acts of another department acting within its proper sphere of
governmental power, within the scope of its authority." Matheson v. Ferry. 641 P.2d
674, 678 (Utah 1982) (quoting Mulcahy v. Public Service Commission. 101 Utah 245,
117 P.2d 298 (1941) (citing Marbury v. Madison. 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803))).
A. Waiver. Appellate courts will not consider an issue, including a
constitutional argument, raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial court
committed plain error or the case involves exceptional circumstances. Brown. 856
P.2d at 359. In affirming defendant's first direct appeal in this case, the Utah Supreme

10

Court wrote, "It is black-letter law that an appellate court will not address issues raised
for the first time on appeal except in extraordinary circumstances that do not exist
here." Smith, 866 P.2d at 532.
It was not plain error for the trial court to comply with a statutory requirement,
and defendant has failed to assert let alone establish exceptional circumstances in this
case (£££ Def. Br. at 6-8).
B. No violation. In any event, neither the now-challenged statute, nor the trial
court's compliance, violated the constitutional provision regarding separation of
powers. The statute neither transferred a function of an Executive agency to the
Judiciary, nor did the trial court usurp control of the judgment or officials acts of an
Executive agency. The statute itself requires only that the trial court provide the Board
with a nonbinding opinion, information regarding the character of the offender, and any
aggravating or mitigating information in its possession. Utah Code Ann. §77-2713(5)(a) (1996). It is implicit that this information is to aid the Board in carrying out
its functions. In addition, the trial court did not usurp control of the Board, but simply
provided information: its opinion was styled as a recommendation rather than a
judgment, order, or decree (R. 31). It is therefore clear that there was no violation of
separation of powers. Sfifi alSQ State v. Bishop. 717 P.2d 261, 263-64 (Utah 1986) (the
minimum mandatory sentencing provision in the child sodomy statute does not infringe
the separation of powers provision of the Utah Constitution).
11

Therefore, even if he is excused from his waiver, defendant's constitutional
argument is without merit.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's order denying defendant's motion to modify his sentence should
be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this J^fUday of February, 1997.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

(BARNARD N. MADSEN
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing motion and order
for enlargement of time was mailed to Tracy Eugene Smith, P.O. Box 250, Draper,
Utah 84020, this Q v

day of February, 1997.

~^5~M/g<^£ge.
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Appendix A

IV.-.-

NOV 22 1993
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
ANGELA F. MICKLOS (6229)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondents
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1021
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

TRACY EUGENE SMITH,
Petitioner,

:

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER

v.

:

HANK GALETKA, UTAH STATE
PRISON, AND STATE OF UTAH

:

Case No.

:

Judge David S. Young

Respondents,

930900217 HC

Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus came before
the Court for an evidentiary hearing August 26, 1993, the Honorable
David

S. Young presiding.

Petitioner was present

represented by Craig S. Cook.

and

was

Respondents were represented by

Angela F. Micklos and J. Frederic Voros, Jr., Assistant Attorneys
General.

Witnesses from out of town and out of State being

present, the Court proceeded to hear the merits of the petition and
reserved ruling on the State's motion to dismiss on procedural
grounds.

After

hearing

testimony,

receiving

evidence,

and

considering counsels' arguments, the Court enters the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On November 14, 1988, petitioner pled guilty to first

degree murder, a capital offense.

The trial court sentenced

petitioner to life imprisonment.
2.

The trial court recommended that petitioner spend at

least 20 years in prison prior to being considered for parole.
3.

During, his

criminal

proceedings,

petitioner

was

represented by James Shumate.
4.

Mr. Shumate did not object to the trial court's 20-year

recommendation.
5.

Mr. Shumate did not request a presentence investigation

report.
6.
reasonably

Based

on

all

believed

that

available
a

information,

presentence

report

Mr.

Shumate

would

detail

petitioner's prior crimes, and on balance, would be a negative
factor in the sentencing decision.
7.

Petitioner presented no evidence that the presentence

report would have contained mitigating information.
8.

Mr.

Shumate

did

not

call

mitigating

witnesses

at

petitioner's sentencing hearing.
9.

Petitioner presented no evidence of what testimony any

mitigating witnesses would have given, had they been called at the
sentencing hearing.
2

10.

At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Shumate did not make a

statement on petitioner's behalf, having previously argued all
mitigating

factors

to

the

Court

in

chambers

during

a plea

conference.
11.

Petitioner made a statement on his own behalf, prior to

being sentenced.
12.

Prior to being sentenced, petitioner knew that he faced

a maximum of life imprisonment.
13.

By entering a guilty plea, petitioner avoided the death

penalty, which was his primary objective in pleading guilty.
14.

A condition of the plea bargain was that petitioner would

have been able to withdraw his plea if the trial court had imposed
the death penalty.
15.

Mr. Shumate correctly advised petitioner that the Court

would almost certainly impose a sentence up to and including life
imprisonment.
16.

Mr. Shumate opined to petitioner that he might spend five

to seven years in prison.
17.

Mr. Shumate correctly advised petitioner that the length

of time he would actually serve in prison was under the exclusive
control of the Board of Pardons, which would be greatly influenced
by petitioner's conduct while in prison.

3

18.

The trial judge's 20-year recommendation is not a major

factor relied on by the Board of Pardons in setting parole
rehearing dates.

Such recommendations are accorded greater or

lesser weight depending upon their factual support.

The judge's

recommendation here was based solely on the facts of the crime
itself.
19.

Defendants who have pled guilty to the capital offense of

first degree murder ordinarily receive 20 to 25 year rehearing
dates from the Board of Pardons.
20.

On November 12, 1991, petitioner went before the Utah

Board of Pardons for an original parole grant hearing. Petitioner
was given a rehearing date of October, 2008.
21.
setting

The Board of Pardons stated in writing its reasons for
a

20-year

rehearing

date.

The

reasons

included

petitioner's prison misconduct, but did not include the judge's
recommendation.
22.

Petitioner has the right to petition the Board of Pardons

for an earlier rehearing date.
23.
upon

The State's case against petitioner was strong, based

eyewitness

testimony

and

the testimony

of petitioner's

companion, Timothy Miller.
24.

Mr. Shumate testified that petitioner confessed to him

that his purpose in approaching the victim was to obtain money, by
4

violent means if necessary, and that he shot the victim without
provocation.
25.

Had

petitioner

known that

the

judge was going

to

recommend 20 years incarceration, petitioner might still have pled
guilty.
26.

Petitioner never testified that but for his counsel's

alleged deficiencies, petitioner would not have pled guilty but
would have insisted upon going to trial.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel, petitioner must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the
evidence, both that Mr. Shumate's performance

fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness, and that petitioner was
prejudiced by any unreasonable representation.

See Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
2.

In order to meet the prejudice prong, petitioner must

demonstrate

that

but

for Mr. Shumate's

errors, there

is a

reasonable probability that he would have received a more favorable
sentence and rehearing date.

With respect to petitioner's claim

that his plea was involuntary due to Mr. Shumate's ineffectiveness,
petitioner must demonstrate that but for Mr. Shumate's error,
petitioner would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted
upon going to trial. See Strickland, supra;
5

Hill v. Lockhart, 474

U.S. 52 (1985).
3.

Mr. Shumate's representation was more than adequate; it

did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.
4.

Even if Mr. Shumate committed error, petitioner has

failed to demonstrate prejudice.
5.

Petitioner was well aware when he pled guilty that he

faced a life sentence.
6.

The trial court had only three sentencing options:

probation, life imprisonment, and the death penalty.
7.

Petitioner has failed to show that he would have received

a lesser sentence if Mr. Shumate had requested a presentence
investigation

report, called mitigating witnesses, or made a

statement on petitioner's behalf at sentencing.
8.

The Board of Pardons is not bound by the trial court's

20-year recommendation. There is no support for petitioner's claim
that, had Mr. Shumate objected to the 20-year recommendation,
petitioner would have received a lesser sentence and/or an earlier
rehearing date.
ORDER
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, and good cause appearing, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED
AND DECREED as follows:

The petition for habeas corpus or post-

conviction relief is denied.
6

DATED this

22-^day of November, 1993
.THE COURT?

HONORABLE D
Third Distr/

Approved as to form:

Craig S. Cook
Attorney for petitioner
.'-''i^RTcSALT

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I

hereby

certify

that

a true

and accurate

copy

of the

foregoing unsigned FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
was mailed this

November, 1993 to:

Craig S. Cook, Esq.
Attorney for Petitioner
3645 East 3100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
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IF 0 1 I I ID
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DIStMc^ 1 " 6
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF ^ ^ g ^ y ^ ^
STATE OF UTAH,

|

MEMORANDUM OPINION

i

CASE NO. 631

Plaintiff,
vs.
TRACY EUGENE SMITH,
I

Defendant.

S

The defendant, Tracy Eugene Smith, entered a plea of guilty to the crime of Murder
in the First Degree, a capital felony, on November 14, 1988. The Court sentenced him to
serve a life sentence and recommended to the Board of Pardons that he serve at least 20
years before being allowed parole. The defendant has since filed at least one appeal and
several petitions for extraordinary relief.
On May 15, 1996, the defendant caused to be filed a "Motion for an Order of Court
Correcting a Sentence that was Imposed in an Illegal Manner/ The defendant moves the
Court to correct or modify the sentence given by deleting the Court's recommendation that
the defendant serve 20 years before being paroled. The defendant correctly argues that the
Court can correct an illegal sentence at any time. (See Rule 22, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.)
The alleged illegality raised by the defendant is that the Court sentenced the defendant
to a life sentence and then made a recommendation pursuant to 77-27-13(5) UCA. The
defendant argues that the Court acted illegally because that statutory provision, by its own
terms, applies only to cases where an "indeterminate sentence is imposed." Defendant takes

-2the position, citing no authority supporting his view, that a life sentence is not an
indeterminate sentence.
The Court now holds that the position of the defendant is incorrect under the Utah
sentencing scheme. In fact a life sentence for Murder, a capital felony, is an indeterminate
sentence. Therefore the sentence is not illegal.
Under Utah's sentencing scheme, all commitments to prison are considered
indeterminate sentences unless otherwise provided by law. (77-18-4 UCA) Utah's
Constitution and statutes provide for a Board of Pardons which body is charged with the
authority and responsibility of determining whether a sentence will be fully served, modified,
or terminated. (See 77-27-5 UCA; Andrus v. Turner. 590 P.2d 363; Raslins v. Holden. 869
P-2d958.)
The Board of Pardons has unfettered discretion in carrying out its function and its
decisions are not subject to judicial scrutiny, except in limited cases.
An indeterminate sentence is one fixed by the sentencing authority (the Court) as a
maximum sentence or within a possible minimum/maximum range, understanding that the
actual time to be serve will be later determined by another entity, the Board of Pardons.1
The alternative plan, determinate sentencing, is used in some states and jurisdictions. Under
determinate sentencing the Court fixes the exact number of years, months or days to be
served by the defendant and no other entity has authority to require more or less, as long as
the sentence is legally permissible. This is not Utah's approach to sentencing.

*See Mutart v. Pratt. 170 P.67; State v. Empev. 239 P.25; Lee Lim v. Davis. 284
P.232.

A life sentence for capital murder is an indeterminate sentence modifiable by the
Board of Pardons. Otherwise the Court's recommendation of 20 years before parole would
be irrelevant and meaningless and this Motion would never have been made. It is evident
that the Utah Legislature considers a life sentence for capital murder as an indeterminate
sentence, since it has enacted, since the sentencing in this case, a new possible sentence in
such cases, life without possibility of parole. (See 76-3-201 UCA)
The defendant's Motion is denied. The sentence in his case was not illegal as he
complains.
DATED this

C> "day
day of July 1996.
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Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that on this /p'' day of July 1996,1 mailed true and correct copies
of the above and foregoing MEMORANDUM OPINION, first-class postage prepaid, to the
following:
Leo G. Kanell, Esq.
Beaver County Attorney
P.O. Box 471
Beaver, UT 84713
Tracy Eugene Smith
P.O. Box 250
Draper, UT 84020

V/XQ^,
/>X^
Maxine Munson, Deputy Clerk

